教育背景
2005～2010 加州大学圣迭戈分校 获得经济学博士
2001～2005 北京大学光华管理学院 取得金融学学士
研究领域
行为经济学，行为金融学
劳动经济学，实验经济学，发展经济学
主要研究成果
Publications:
With Vincent P. Crawford, “New York City Cabdrivers' Labor Supply Revisited: Reference-Dependent Utility with Targets for Hours and Income”, American Economic Review 101 (December 2011),in press
Abstract: This paper proposes a model of cabdrivers’ labor supply, building on Henry S. Farber’s (2005, 2008) empirical analyses and Botond K?szegi and Matthew Rabin’s (2006; henceforth “KR”) theory or reference-dependent preferences. Following KR, our model has targets for hours as well as income, both determined by rational expectations. Estimated with Farber’s data, our model reconciles his finding that stopping probabilities are significantly related to hours but not income with Colin Camerer et al.’s (1997) negative wage elasticity of hours; and avoids his criticism that estimates of drivers’ income targets are too unstable to yield a useful model of labor supply.
Working Papers:
“The Disposition Effect and Expectations as Reference Point.” revise and resubmit to Journal of Finance
Abstract:This paper proposes a model of reference-dependent preferences to explain the disposition effect, the tendency for investors in the stock market to be more willing to sell winners than losers. Focusing on aversion to losses relative to a reference point, the model predicts a V-shaped relationship between the optimal stock position and stock price, which closely links the minimum-demand point to the reference point. I estimate the model empirically using Odean (1999)’s data on individual trading from a large brokerage house. The estimates show that (i) the predicted V-shape relationship exists for a large majority of investors, and (ii) the estimated reference point demonstrates properties that make expectations the most reasonable candidate. The fact that reference point is influenced by expectations that are mostly positive due to the initial purchase decision allows a simple explanation of the disposition effect.
With Wanchuan Lin and Yiming Liu, "Will Formal Risk Sharing Arrangements Crowd Out Informal Mechanisms: An Experimental Study" 2011
Abstract:People make private transfer as informal risk-sharing mechanism in many developing countries. Will the introduction of formal insurance crowd out such private transfer? What are the welfare consequences? This paper presents the first laboratory study to investigate these issues. We show that the introduction of formal insurance crowds out informal mechanisms. But this effect is weakened by ex-ante income inequality and the inertia of the existing informal mechanisms. We further show that private transfers can be decomposed into two equally important motives: risk sharing and altruism, with the crowding-out effect on altruism similar to that on risk sharing. Finally, we find that the increase in formal insurance and decrease in private transfer overall provide better risk coverage hence improving welfare.
"Social Distance, Interpersonal Interaction and Impersonal Exchange", 2010
Abstract:Personal relationships and anonymous market have been previously modeled in ways that prevent them from coexisting in equilibrium as contract enforcement mechanisms. Empirical evidence nonetheless suggests that they sometimes coexist. This paper introduces social utility into preferences, which is determined by social distance and specific to personal relationships but not to impersonal anonymous market exchange. This preference-based approach allows the two modes of exchange to coexist in equilibrium and further characterizes how their market shares depend on the degree of social heterogeneity. The possibility of impersonal exchange improves welfare and equality among buyers in general. But there also exist cases where competition between the two forms of exchange makes welfare and equality deteriorate.
Research in Progress:
"Social Distance and the Crowding-out Effect of Formal Insurance on Informal Risk Sharing"
"Social Learning or Social Conformity? The Case of Stock Market Participation Decision"
