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安全I&C功能的附加要求英中对照翻译文件 |
6.5.2 Additional requirements for safety I&C Functions 安全I&C功能的附加要求
The safety I&C functions shall all be harmonized to provide: 应使安全I&C功能协调一致，从而具备：
? A clear and binding association with the fluid systems they control, 与它们控制的流体系统的明确、牢固的关联，
? Clear and simple functions which allow a well balanced design (avoiding under or over-design), 使能够实现良好平衡设计（避免设计不足或设计过度）的明确、简单的功能，
? Unequivocal use of safety I&C functions (priority rules for the case of antagonistic functions), 安全I&C功能的明确使用（用于对抗性功能的优先级规则），
? The overall required reliability for the supported safety functions, 支持安全功能所要求的总体可靠性，
? An optimal use of diversity (for the fluid systems as well as for the I&C systems) to cope with CCFs, 用以对付CCF的多样性最佳运用（对于流体系统以及I&C系统），
? An optimal use of backup systems (for the fluid systems as well as for the I&C systems) to implement Design extension condition (DEC) measures (e. g. systems to cope with ATWS). 用以实施设计延伸条件措施（例如，应对ATWS的系统）的支持系统最佳运用（对于流体系统以及I&C系统）。
The independence of functions shall be applied to the greatest possible extent. However, in order to optimize systems and components from an economic point of view, multiple use of equipment should be favored while meeting the independence requirements for safety I&C functions. 功能的独立性应运用到可能实现的最大程度。但是，为了从经济角度使系统和构件达到最优化，在满足安全I&C功能的独立要求的同时，对设备的多样性使用更为有利。
Each individual safety I&C function is analyzed to detect negative influences on other safety I&C functions (not unequivocally safety-oriented actions and feedback via the process due to process control of one function effect on another function). Counter-measures shall be applied to cope with negative influences.
For all the safety I&C functions, the deterministic design requirements to cope with the single failure, CCF, internal/external hazards shall be settled in such a way that the required overall reliability of a safety I&C function is achieved.通过对所有单独的安全I&C功能进行分析，来检测对其他安全I&C功能（由一个功能影响另一个功能的过程控制引起的并非明确面向安全的操作和经由过程的反馈）的负面影响。应采取对策来应付负面影响。对于所有安全I&C功能，确立针对单一故障、CCF、内部/外部危害的决定性设计要求的方式，应使所要求的安全I&C功能的总体可靠性得以实现。
1) Completion of action 操作的完成
? The design shall be such that, when initiated, an automatic safety action continues to completion. 设计应该做到，一旦起动，自动安全操作会持续到完成。
? Deliberate and particular operator action shall be necessary to return to the ESF normal operation after the protective action demand is reset. A safety system actuation is always an indication of some abnormal condition and investigation into the cause must be carried out before the system can be secured. 为了在保护性操作重置后返回到ESF正常运行，谨慎和细致的操作员行动是必要的。安全系统的起动总是暗示着某些异常状况，必须在系统被保护锁定之前进行原因的调查。
2) Operational bypasses 操作旁路
? When operating conditions require automatic or manual bypass of an automatic safety function, the design shall be such that the bypass will be automatically removed whenever that bypass is no longer permitted. The means used to automatically remove the bypass is part of the highest safety level system. 当运行状况要求自动或手动地避开某个自动安全功能时，相应的设计应做到，当任何时候旁路不再被容许时，旁路会被自动取消。用来自动取消旁路的手段属于最高安全等级系统。
? Attention should be paid on particular Design Basis Conditions to be taken into account in the application of the single failure criterion. 应特别注意在应用单一故障标准时所考虑的特定的设计基础条件。
? When an event can cause unsafe condition and can concurrently prevent proper operation of some part of the protection system, the required protective action shall be completed by the remaining part of the protection system assuming a single failure and maintenance or test in progress. 当某个事件会造成不安全状态，并会同时阻止保护系统某些部分的正常运行时，应由保护系统的其余部分完成所需要的保护操作，假设发生的是单一故障，而维护或测试正在进行中。
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