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煤电联动政策中救助博弈分析 |
上式表明，电力生产企业在20％的时候选择积极改进生产效率。对政府而言，电力生产企业在20％的时候选择积极改进是最优的混合策略，如果这个概率大于20％，政府将会选择政策扶植，否则将会选择不予帮助。
计算表明，在该混合博弈模型中，政府以50％的概率选择政策扶植，也就是说，无论政府是否扶植，电力生产企业有20％的可能选择积极改进自身生产效率，而选择等待政策帮助最有可能发生，出现的概率为80％。在电煤价格上涨、企业出现亏损的情况下，电力企业会倾向积极寻求监管方的政策支持，这比改进自身生产效率更有利。
事实表明，与国内的其他行业垄断企业一样，选择涨价已经成为电力生产企业转嫁成本、提升利润的最便捷、最长效机制。据国家发改委全国价格监测机构对全国36个大中城市的监测数据，2000～2002年普通工业用电价格分别上涨了4.2％、6.7％和4.65％，如果按照平均成本计算，电力价格每上涨0.02元就相当于煤炭价格上涨56元，电的燃料平均成本由0.080元/（kW?h）上升至0.083元/（kW?h），上涨幅度约为3.75％，低于电力价格上涨的幅度]。然而，国家发改委决定自2006年6月30日起，继续调整华北、南方、华中、华东、东北和西北电网的上网电价，此次电价调整后，全国上网电价平均上调11.74元/千千瓦时，销售电价平均提高24.94元/千千瓦时。这已经是继2004年国家对电价以“顺价”和“联动”方式进行的第四次调整，考虑到电力行业技术进步因素，发电装机容量的平均造价从2002年以前的5000元/千瓦下降到了4000元/千瓦，2003年至2005年总共节约了1400亿的投资，电价调整累计幅度已经很大。电力生产企业成功的将对博弈双方实际收益率和合作意愿实施反向影响的事件转化为施加同向影响的制度设定，将煤电系统内的不利矛盾转嫁到系统外的弱势的消费者身上，从而坚持自己持有的具备严格正相关回归收入结构和预期收益率自动延续性的刚性思维曲线。
华译网 上海翻译公司曾经翻译过大量有关 煤电联动政策中救助博弈分析资料文件。
The above equation shows, electric power enterprise choose initiative amelioration at the possibility of 20%.To the government, enterprise’s initiative amelioration at 20% is the dominant mixed strategy. The government will choose to support when enterprise’s possibility is larger than 20%, but will not if the figure is smaller than that.
After calculation, we see in the mixed game model that the government chooses to support at the possibility of 50%, that is to say, electric power enterprise holds the possibility of 20% to initiatively ameliorate whether the government supports or not. When the price of electricity and coal appreciates, electric power enterprise prefers resorting to regulator’s support to promoting productivity, for the former brings more benefit to her.
Facts show that appreciation has become the most convenient system with long lasting effect for Chinese electric power enterprises, and other monopolists alike in other industries, to transfer cost and increase profit. According to the data from 36 large and medium cities all over China by NDRC’s price supervisor, electricity price for medium industrial use appreciated by 4.2%, 6.7% and 4.65% from 2000 to 2002. Every 0.02 Yuan appreciation of electricity indicates 56 Yuan inflation in coal price, calculated according to the average cost of producing electricity. Fuel cost of producing electricity rises from 0.080 Yuan/kWh to 0.083 Yuan/kWh, a mark-up of about 3.75%, smaller than that of electricity price. However, NDRC decided to adjust the Onto-grid Electricity Price (OEP) in North China, South China, Centre China, East China, North East and North West.
After this adjustment, OEP appreciates by 11.74 Yuan/thousand kWh while the sale price by 24.94 Yuan/ thousand kWh. This is the fourth adjustment applied to electricity price in an indexed sales and linkage way since 2004. Considering the technical improvement in electric power industry, the average cost of dynamotor capacity deduced from 5000 Yuan/kW before 2002 to 5000 Yuan/kW, saving 140 billion investments from 2003 to 2005, cumulative mark-up of electricity price has been very large. Electric power enterprises’ system settings convert the event that baffles the effective yield and cooperative will into one that drives them forward, and transfer the adverse conflict to the customers who are out of system, therefore stick to their rigid thinking curve that embraces restrict positive-correlation regressive income structure and automatic continuing of expected yield.
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